Chapter 6 Book Excerpt: Making Critical Decisions

Audio read by Dr. Jeff McCausland

Excerpt written by Jeff McCausland and Tom Vossler

Upon his arrival at Gettysburg around midnight of July 1st, Union Army of the Potomac commander General George G. Meade began issuing orders for the establishment of the soon-to-be famous fishhook shaped defensive position on the high ground south of Gettysburg. The left end of that defensive line included the lower part of Cemetery Ridge and the hill subsequently known as Little Round Top. As part of the defensive plan, Major General Daniel Edgar Sickles was under orders to occupy and defend a mile-long section on the south end of that line with his 10,000 soldiers of the Third Army Corps.

However, Sickles did not occupy the line assigned to him. At mid-day of the second day of the battle, Sickles advanced his 10,000 men three-quarters of a mile forward of their assigned position, all the way out to the Emmitsburg Road.  His subsequent rationale in defense of this action was that he thought the ground which he occupied along the Emmitsburg Road, the Peach Orchard, the Wheatfield and Devils Den was better terrain upon which to establish a Union defense than his assigned position on the southern portion of Cemetery Ridge.

With Sickles’ troops in their unauthorized and overly exposed position, General Meade rode to the front to confront General Sickles.  He was seeking an explanation for Sickles’ failure to comply with the defensive plan. Words and opinions were briefly exchanged and then the Confederate artillery bombardment in preparation of their infantry attack began. It was too late for Sickles to move his corps back to his assigned line of defense. Meade galloped backed to Cemetery Ridge promising Sickles infantry and artillery reinforcements for his overly-extended salient position.

While Sickles and Meade were thrashing-out the situation between themselves, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren made his way to the summit of Little Round Top, a prominent hill on the extreme left flank of the Union defensive line. Warren was a staff officer, the Chief Engineer of the Union Army of the Potomac. As such, Warren had come to Little Round Top to inspect the defense of the hill. But as chief advisor to the commander of the Army of the Potomac on engineering matters, he had no command authority over combat units.

Upon arriving at the summit of Little Round Top, Warren was amazed to find the hill undefended. When Sickles established his part of the defensive line forward of Cemetery Ridge, he left no defending troops on the hill. Noticing the concentration of Confederate troops on Seminary Ridge opposite the hill, Warren sent one of his aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Ranald Mackenzie down the hill in a race against time to find an infantry commander willing to come and defend the hill.

Col. Vincent Strong

Col. Vincent Strong

The Lieutenant’s overtures in Warren’s name for reinforcing troops to be sent to Little Round Top were rebuffed by several commanders. As fate would have it, Lieutenant Mackenzie then encountered infantry brigade commander Colonel Strong Vincent. The 1,400 man brigade commanded by Vincent was part of the reinforcements Meade had promised Sickles, and Vincent was just then marching his brigade forward to Sickles position as he had been ordered.

Once again, in Brigadier General Warren’s name, Lieutenant Mackenzie pleaded his case, this time to Vincent, for troops to be taken to Little Round Top to defend the hill.What is Vincent to do?He is under orders to take his troops as reinforcements to General Sickles in the Wheatfield. But now he hears new information from someone outside his chain of command and without command authority over him. However, the information appears to be of critical importance concerning a key position left undefended. What is he to do? He must decide!

MAKING CRITICAL DECISIONS

Vincent faced an enormous leadership challenge. His orders were very clear—move his brigade forward into the Wheatfield in support of the III Union Corps. But after learning of the situation on Little Round Top, he quickly realized that this hill was critical terrain. It anchored the southern end of the Union line. If the Rebels captured it, the Union army’s position on Cemetery Ridge would be compromised. Warren had no command authority over him or his men, but Vincent knew and respected him. He quickly led his brigade out of line of march to the Wheatfield and marched instead to the east side of Little Round Top, where they took an old logging trail to climb to the top of the hill.

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This raises a fundamental question: How do leaders go about making critical decisions for their organization? Malcolm Gladwell in his book Blink argues that decisions leaders make quickly are often as good as, or even better than, those they agonize over. Gladwell underscores, however, the special value Western culture in particular places on complex, analytical decision-making approaches. Unfortunately, this method is frequently time-consuming and may be inappropriate during periods of rapid change or crisis. As a result, Gladwell argued that successful organizations must develop more decentralized decision-making processes and support the power of intuition from its experts particularly at difficult moments.[i]      

Air Force Colonel (retired) John Boyd in many ways mirrored many of Gladwell’s arguments. Boyd had been a fighter pilot during the Korean War, and upon his return to the United States was assigned to the US Air Force Weapons School to train future pilots. Over time he became the head of the Academic Section and developed tactics for aerial combat as well as theories for improved pilot training. After retiring from the Air Force Boyd became a consultant to many large corporations and adviser to the Department of Defense.    

His most celebrated concept was the OODA loop, which is the cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act. Boyd argued that all decision-making occurs in a recurring succession of observing the environment in which an individual or organization is operating, orienting on the decision-maker’s mental state and key changes that are occurring in the environment, making a decision in a more timely fashion than an adversary or the competition, and acting on that decision. The OODA loop provides leaders both a framework for developing leadership within their organizations and their own decision-making methodology, particularly during difficult moments.

Clearly time is the key variable, since the OODA loop is designed to allow any entity (individual or organization) to “get inside” their opposition’s decision cycle and gain comparative advantage. It requires an ability to operate at a faster tempo. Proponents of the OODA loop argue that it provides a means for organizational agility to triumph over raw power. This approach to decision-making seeks to generate disorder and confusion in opponents so that they are reacting to situations as opposed to acting upon them. That’s why Boyd argued that effective organizations must develop a climate that encourages objective-driven choice, or “directive control,” as opposed to “method-driven control.” This allows the abilities and mental capacities of the team to be maximized. But this further requires leaders to encourage decentralization in their organizations and accept a certain level of chaos if they are going to use the OODA loop effectively.   

Colonel Strong Vincent could have theoretically been court-martialed for violating his orders, though we will never know if that was a real danger since he was killed in the defense of Little Round Top. But he clearly observed the situation, oriented on the critical importance of the hill, quickly decided, and acted in a timely fashion. He was able to make his decision “inside the decision cycle” of the advancing Confederates. Many have argued that his fateful decision demonstrated “disciplined disobedience” by a leader who consciously violated what he had been directed to do by his boss because he was convinced it was best for the overall organization at a critical juncture.  

[i] Malcolm Gladwell, Blink (New York: Little, Brown, 2005).    


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Parts of this article are excerpted and adapted from Battle Tested! Gettysburg Leadership Lessons for 21st Century Leaders written by Jeffrey D. McCausland and Tom Vossler. The book is available now! Order your copy at: https://bit.ly/battletestedbook.